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 Though it has often been quipped that the September 11th attacks changed “everything”, 
domestic policy alterations were among the most significant changes after 9/11. Specifically, the 
2002 Ashcroft Attorney General Guidelines and the 2008 Mukasey Attorney General Guidelines 
were two of the most impactful policy changes following 9/11. These Attorney General 
Guidelines changed the way the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) investigated terrorism in 
the United States in addition to making counterterrorism the FBI’s top priority. One of the ways 
the FBI prevents terrorism is through the use of undercover agents and confidential informants. 
How the 2002 and 2008 Attorney General Guidelines influenced the FBI’s use of human 
intelligence in terrorism investigations has remained to be seen. This study reviews the historical 
policy changes following 9/11 and examines their influence on the FBI’s use of undercover 
operatives in terrorism cases. While I found that the percentage of terrorism investigations that 
used undercover operatives dropped by over 40% after the Ashcroft Guidelines were 
implemented, I also found that investigations that used undercover operatives were more 
successful in preventing terrorism incidents compared to terrorism investigations that did not use 
undercover operatives. Thus, policy makers should use caution when amending guidelines to 
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HUMAN INTELLIGENCE IN FEDERAL TERRORISM CASES 
I. Introduction 
  The terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 took the lives of nearly 3,000 people in New 
York, Washington D.C., and Pennsylvania. During the aftermath of those attacks, the media and 
the public looked for someone to blame. Among those who received blame, the intelligence 
community faced some of the heaviest criticism. In the decade following the 9/11 attacks, 
policymakers amended guidelines upon which the intelligence community operated. The changes 
in guidelines were intended to help law enforcement and intelligence analysts prevent future 
terrorist attacks like those that occurred on September 11th, from happening again.  
  The intelligence community in the United States encompasses sixteen different agencies 
and offices, each handled by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (Kaplan, 2012). 
Within these sixteen agencies are six program managers who are responsible for gathering and 
examining various types of intelligence information (Kaplan, 2012). Amid these program 
manager agencies is the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). As a member of the intelligence 
community, the FBI is responsible for warning policymakers of potential threats to the nation’s 
security (Schalch, 2003). Moreover, the FBI is the lead authority in investigating terrorism in the 
United States. In order to warn policymakers of potential threats, the FBI obtains and examines 
intelligence information gathered via human intelligence, also known as confidential informants 
and undercover agents. The procedures governing the FBI’s domestic investigative operations 
are known as the Attorney General Guidelines. Since the attacks on September 11, 2001, there 
have been two changes in these guidelines: the 2002 John Ashcroft Attorney General Guidelines, 
and the 2008 Michael Mukasey Attorney General Guidelines. The Ashcroft Guidelines expanded 
the FBI’s investigative procedures and revived the agency’s domestic intelligence role. Six years 
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later, the 2008 Mukasey Guidelines again bolstered the FBI’s investigative abilities by imposing 
fewer restrictions (Shields, 2012).  
  Changes to the guidelines over the past decade have not only increased the FBI’s power, 
but they also changed its ability to use confidential informants and undercover agents. Few 
empirical studies have analyzed the FBI’s use of confidential informants and undercover agents 
in domestic terrorism incidents. Of those that have, there have been several key findings. First, it 
is known that just over 40% of domestic terrorism cases use human intelligence (Greenberg, 
2011). Second, there was nearly a 40% drop in the use of informants and over a 25% drop in the 
use of undercover agents in the immediate years following 9/11 (Shields, 2012). Finally, 
confidential informants and undercover agents represent some of the most successful tactics in 
detecting terrorist plots and in identifying and apprehending perpetrators in completed terrorist 
attacks (Hewitt, 2014). Thus, limited research on human intelligence in terrorism cases has 
shown the significance of undercover operatives.  
  To better understand changes in the use of human intelligence in terrorism investigations, 
Structural Contextual Theory will be applied to an analysis of terrorism data before and after the 
9/11 attacks. Structural Contextual Theory suggests that components of the justice system 
normally work rather autonomously of one another, but also that in some political environments 
of the criminal justice operations come together to collectively target a specific type of crime and 
criminal for the purposes of prosecution (Hagan, 1989). In the past, Structural Contextual Theory 
has been used to help explain responses to terrorism in terms of sentencing outcomes. Smith and 
Damphousse (1998) hypothesized that if terrorism caught the public’s attention the justice 
system would work together to target terrorist actors using the justice system. Collaboration 
throughout the justice system would then limit discretion among prosecuting and sentencing 
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terrorists. Thus, the more seriously terrorism is viewed by the public, the less difference there 
should be in sentencing outcomes in terrorism cases. Smith and Damphousse (1998) found 
nearly four times more explained variance in sentence outcomes for terrorists than nonterrorists, 
supporting structural contextual theory. Using Structural Contextual Theory, this paper will 
examine the use of confidential informants and undercover agents post-9/11 to address two 
research questions. The first research question asks how the Ashcroft and Mukasey Guidelines 
changed the use of confidential informants and undercover agents used in terrorism cases. The 
second research question asks what impact, if any, the changes in the use of undercover agents 
and confidential informants have had on case processing and outcomes in terrorism cases.   
 As mentioned previously, there is a shortcoming in empirical research on the use of 
confidential informants and undercover agents in domestic terrorism cases. In particular, prior 
literature has yet to examine the use of human intelligence in the last several years (Shields, 
2012; Greenberg, 2011). Additionally, the most recent study involving human intelligence did 
not examine the nature of terrorism case outcomes in cases with informants and undercover 
agents (see Hewitt, 2014). My study builds directly on Shields (2012), as well as Greenberg 
(2011) and Hewitt (2014), by extending the time frame of analyzing human intelligence to 2014 
and by examining how the use of confidential informants and undercover agents varies across 
category of terrorism, intended target type, and conviction rate in cases with human intelligence 
(compared to cases without human intelligence among other factors).  
 Examining confidential informants and undercover agents through this study will add to 
existing literature while also being socially relevant. After 9/11 the FBI was criticized for not 
connecting the dots concerning information they possessed that potentially could have prevented 
the attacks from that day. One criticism was that the FBI was too reactive and suffered from 
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structural weaknesses (Zegart, 2007). FBI agents were trained to be reactive, case driven, and 
conviction oriented- to investigate past crimes and not to prevent future ones (Zegart, 2007). In 
response to this criticism, Attorney General John Ashcroft changed the FBI from a reactive 
agency to a proactive agency with his 2002 Attorney General Guidelines by bolstering 
investigative procedures. While Ashcroft changed the structure of the FBI into a proactive 
agency, recent criticism has suggested that the FBI is being too proactive, especially through 
sting operations using confidential informants and undercover agents. One example was 
showcased in the 2014 HBO documentary The Newburgh Sting, which depicts a 2009 terrorism 
plot where four men were allegedly coaxed by an FBI informant to attack U.S. military planes in 
New York. Findings from the current study may be relevant for homeland security policy, as the 
entrapment of defendants and other socially relevant human rights issues have arisen from cases 
involving human intelligence.   
 This study is set up as follows. First, I provide a historical account of policy changes and 
their impact on federal terrorism investigations. Second, I review extant literature on confidential 
informants and undercover agents. Third, I lay out research questions followed by a discussion of 
research methods and specific hypotheses. Fifth, I present the results from my analyses and, 
finally, I end with a discussion of my findings and their implications for policy and future 
research.  
 II. Policy Change and Terrorism Investigations 
Background     
  Terrorism is not a new social problem, but has occurred in its various forms over the 
course of history in most every corner of the world (Mahan & Griset, 2013). In the United States, 
two monumental events changed America’s understanding of modern American terrorism. The 
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first terrorism event was bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah federal building in Oklahoma City by 
far-right extremists Timothy McVeigh and his accomplices in 1995 (Michel & Herbeck, 2001). 
The bombing awakened America to the threat of homegrown, anti-government terrorism. The 
second event was of course the 9/11 hijackings and suicide attacks in New York City, 
Washington D.C., and Pennsylvania by Al Qaeda. The culmination of these attacks demonstrated 
the threat of international terrorism to the country and ushered in vast changes to federal anti-
terrorism policies. Since the 9/11 terrorism attacks, several other smaller-scale terrorism attacks 
(e.g., Boston Marathon bombings), thwarted plots, and revisions to anti-terrorism laws have 
shaped the practices of law enforcement agencies.  
  The FBI was understandably most affected by these changes given its primary 
responsibility to counter terrorism in the United States. While government and intelligence 
agencies may define terrorism differently (Schmid, 2004; Schmid & Jongman, 1988), the FBI 
defines terrorism as “the unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to 
intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof in furtherance 
of political or social objectives” (FBI, 2009, p.ii). In addition to maintaining a clear definition of 
terrorism, the FBI adheres to a set of procedures known as the “Attorney General’s Guidelines 
on General Crimes, Racketeering Enterprise and Domestic Security/Terrorism Investigations” 
that dictate the circumstances in which terrorism investigations can be initiated. The Attorney 
General Guidelines have evolved over the last several decades by the Department of Justice and 
in response to social criticism and the changing landscape of social and political violence in the 
United States. 
 Attorney General Edward Levi created the first Attorney General Guidelines in 1976. 
The guidelines were developed in part as a response to the Watergate scandal and the free speech 
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and privacy violations uncovered during the Nixon Administration. The purpose of the stricter 
guidelines was to impose new standards by which “domestic security investigations” could be 
initiated (FBI Statutory Charter, 1978). The proactive domestic intelligence gathering 
capabilities of the FBI were curbed and domestic terrorism cases were opened based strictly on 
the predicate of known criminal activity.  
While the Levi guidelines were created to restrict the FBI’s investigative authority, a 
series of attacks by left-wing terrorists would lead the government to reconsider such changes 
(Smith, 1994). In response to these attacks, Attorney General William Smith issued a new set of 
guidelines in 1983 that gave FBI field offices around the nation greater flexibility in the 
investigative process (Smith, 1994). The FBI, however, continued to avoid opening 
investigations of individual terrorists and relied on the establishment of criminal predicate before 
opening counterterrorism investigations throughout the 1980s.  
After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the 9/11 Commission Report revealed that a number of 
opportunities for the FBI and other law enforcement agencies to intercept the deadly plot against 
the United States were missed (9/11 Commission, 2004; see also Zegart, 2007). The Report also 
publicly unveiled how organizational “red tape” designed to check the FBI’s authority to 
investigate terrorism in the United States might have inadvertently led to missed opportunities 
for law enforcement and intelligence agencies to “connect the dots.” 
In response to the 9/11 hijackings, the primary mission of the FBI was changed to 
preventing the next terrorist attack (Mueller, 2003). In other words, the FBI essentially overnight 
transitioned back into a proactive domestic intelligence-gathering agency. Attorney General John 
Ashcroft created a new set of guidelines (“Ashcroft Guidelines”) that included allowances for 
longer investigation periods, centralizing fieldwork analysis at FBI headquarters, and eliminating 
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the need to gain permission from FBI Headquarters to open investigations (Office of the 
Attorney General, 2002a; Shields, 2012).  
  While the Ashcroft guidelines were being formed in late 2001, Congress passed the USA 
PATRIOT Act. The PATRIOT Act strengthened the FBI’s investigative authority in terms of 
surveillance and wiretapping. Additionally, the PATRIOT Act loosened standards for obtaining 
warrants and issuing subpoenas in investigative matters (Jones, 2009). After creation of the 
PATRIOT Act there would be no significant policy changes until the 2008 Mukasey Guidelines 
were issued which further enhanced the FBI’s power to investigate cases. In addition to outlining 
the purposes and procedures for three types of investigations (discussed more below), the 
Mukasey Guidelines permitted these investigations on either the violation of federal statutes or 
“threats to national security” (Jones, 2009). 
  While the Ashcroft Guidelines were the first significant changes to the Attorney General 
Guidelines since 1983, they are especially significant to this study because of changes to the 
Confidential Informant Guidelines (Office of the Attorney General, 2002b) and Undercover 
Operations Guidelines (Office of the Attorney General, 2002c). Both of these guidelines provide 
detailed rules regarding the use of confidential informants and undercover agents. A 2005 OIG 
special report reviewing the Confidential Informant Guidelines noted that FBI personnel ranging 
from new agents to the Director stated that the paperwork associated with opening and operating 
informants was excessive, burdensome, and time-consuming. The report also noted that some 
FBI agents had become reluctant to use informants because of these and other administrative and 




 III. Policy Changes 
  The events of 9/11 significantly influenced counterterrorism policy. The 9/11 
Commission scrutinized the FBI for being rooted in law enforcement and not equipped to 
accomplish intelligence assignments (Shields et al, 2009). Changes in policy after these attacks 
substantially altered the way the federal government investigated and prosecuted those 
individuals suspected to be involved in terrorism (Shields et al, 2009). Prior to the specific 2002 
policy changes regarding confidential informants and undercover agents and the general changes 
to the FBI’s investigation of terrorism, domestic antiterrorism policy focused on infiltrating and 
“beheading” terrorist organizations (Shields et al, 2009). After the 2002 policy changes, the 
FBI’s focus as mandated by Attorney General Ashcroft was to intervene early and investigate 
aggressively. Ashcrofti stated that, “our philosophy today is not to wait and sift through the 
rubble following a terrorist attack. Rather, the FBI must intervene early and investigate 
aggressively where information exists suggesting the possibility of terrorism, so as to prevent 
acts of terrorism”. The 2002 Ashcroft Attorney General Guidelines, the USA Patriot Act, and the 
2008 Mukasey Attorney General Guidelines altered the FBI’s approach to combating terrorism. 
The most dramatic of all the post 9/11 policy changes, though, were the Ashcroft Guidelines. 
These guidelines swiftly and singlehandedly transitioned the FBI from being a proactive agency 
to a reactive agency.  
Ashcroft Guidelines 
   On May 30, 2002, Attorney General John Ashcroft issued the first Attorney General’s 
Guidelines on General Crimes, Racketeering Enterprise and Terrorism Enterprise Investigations 
after 9/11. At the time these were issued, Ashcroft and FBI Director Robert Mueller stated that 
the revised guidelines were necessary to abolish departmental barriers limiting field agents and 
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their superiors to handle terrorist threats, while simultaneously directing day-to-day activities of 
federal law enforcement departments within legal and constitutional boundaries (Office of the 
Attorney General, 2005). The 2002 guidelines authorized several new tools for the FBI. The first 
was the authority to start specific types of investigations with fewer evidentiary thresholds and 
without approval from FBI Headquarters (Office of the Attorney General, 2002). Previously, the 
Smith guidelines required FBI Headquarters to approve all terrorism investigations before 
initiation, and the director was to supervise the investigation in 180-day intervals (Ellif, 1984; 
Shields et al, 2009). The new Ashcroft Guidelines provided FBI field offices with the authority 
to commence investigations unilaterally, and allowed those investigations to proceed up to a year 
before reporting them to FBI Headquarters (Shields et al, 2009). Second, the Ashcroft Guidelines 
extended authority to the FBI to use undercover techniques in criminal intelligence investigations 
(racketeering enterprise and terrorism enterprise investigations) that were previously only 
allowed in general crimes investigations (Office of the Attorney General, 2002). The guidelines 
stated that, “In obtaining the foregoing information, any lawful investigative technique may be 
used” (Office of the Attorney General, 2002, pp. 14-17). A third authorization involved public 
places and events. The guidelines maintained that, “for the purpose of detecting or preventing 
terrorist activities, the FBI is authorized to visit any place and attend any event that is open to the 
public, on the same terms and conditions as members of the public generally” (Office of the 
Attorney General, 2002, p. 22). Lastly, the guidelines allowed the FBI to conduct online 
searches, and access online forums and sites, just as the public may for purposes of preventing or 
detecting terrorism or other criminal activities (Office of the Attorney General, 2002). In a 
speech addressing the revisions to the guidelines, Ashcroftii suggested up that a key objective for 
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the FBI was to prevent terrorism by intervening early and investigating aggressively.  
Confidential Informant Guidelines 
  The Confidential Informant Guidelines define confidential informant as, “any individual 
who provides useful and credible information to a Department of Justice Law Enforcement 
Agency (JLEA) regarding felonious criminal activities, and from whom the JLEA expects or 
intends to obtain useful and credible information regarding such activities in the future” (Office 
of the Attorney General, 2002, p.2). The 2002 Ashcroft guidelines contained three minor 
revisions to the Confidential Informant Guidelines. The first change involved the verbatim 
reading of instructions to informants. Under previous guidelines, agents working with 
confidential informants were required to read, verbatim, specific instructions concerning the 
boundaries set on the CIs’ activities (Office of the Inspector General, 2005). The 2002 revision 
to this rule removed the verbatim reading requirement, stating that, “at least one agent of the 
JLEA, along with one additional agent or other law enforcement official present as a witness, 
shall review with the CI written instructions” (Office of Attorney General, 2002, p. 11). FBI 
Director Robert Mueller deemed this change necessary because, “the verbatim instructions, 
written in often intimidating legalese, were proving to have a chilling effect, causing confidential 
informants to leave the program” (Oversight Hearing on Counterterrorism, 2003, p. 89).  
  The second alteration to the CI Guidelines permitted agents to adapt the instructions – 
including instructions that safeguard the confidentiality of the informant’s identity – to the 
informant’s distinct situation (Office of the Inspector General, 2005). The final modification to 
the informant guidelines involved promising immunity from prosecution. Prior guidelines 
required agents handling CIs to instruct them that investigative agencies could not promise 
immunity from prosecution (Office of the Inspector General, 2005). The 2002 Guidelines 
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adamantly clarified agents’ roles stating that, “whether or not this instruction is given to a CI, the 
JLEA does not have any authority to make any promise or commitment that would prevent the 
government from prosecuting an individual…and a JLEA agent must avoid giving any person 
the erroneous impression that he or she has such authority” (Office of the Attorney General, 
2002, p.12).  
Undercover Operations Guidelines 
  The Undercover Operations Guidelines defines an undercover employee as, “any 
employee of the FBI, or employee of a Federal, or local law enforcement agency working under 
the direction and control of the FBI in a particular investigation, whose relationship with the FBI 
is concealed from third parties in the course of an investigative operation by the maintenance of a 
cover or alias identity” (Office of the Attorney General, 2002c, p.1). The 2002 Ashcroft 
Guidelines also provided four major counterterrorism-related revisions to the Undercover 
Operations Guidelines. The first change simply placed an emphasis on terrorism prevention as a 
legitimate goal of undercover operations (Office of the Attorney General, 2005). The 2002 
guidelines stated that, “The use of undercover techniques…is essential to the detection, 
prevention, and prosecution… of terrorism” (Office of the Attorney General, 2002c, p.1).  
The second amendment to the guidelines made explicit and emphasized the FBI’s 
authority to use undercover techniques towards its criminal intelligence investigations goals 
(Office of the Attorney General, 2002c). The guidelines stated that, “In criminal intelligence 
investigations – i.e., racketeering enterprise investigations and terrorism enterprise investigations 
– these methods may be used to further the investigative objective… of detection, prevention, 
and prosecution of the criminal activities of the enterprise” (Office of the Attorney General, 
2002c, p.2).  
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The third alteration to the UCO Guidelines gave Special Agents in Charge (SAC) more 
authority to initiate undercover operations. The guidelines stated that, “the SAC may approve an 
undercover operation when…the initiation, extension, or renewal of an operation is necessary to 
avoid the loss of a significant investigative opportunity” (Office of the Attorney General, 2002c, 
p.15). The fourth and final revision to the UCO Guidelines added one additional factor that 
SAC’s must take into account before approving an operation. The additional factor was, “[t]he 
risk of invasion of privacy or interference with privileged or confidential relationships and any 
potential constitutional concerns or other legal concerns” (Office of the Attorney General, 2002c, 
p.3). In sum, the 2002 revisions of the UCO Guidelines overall gave the FBI more authority to 
utilize undercover operations in terrorism investigations.  
USA PATRIOT Act 
  Like the Attorney General Guidelines, the passing of the USA PATRIOT Act by 
Congress in 2001 significantly enhanced law enforcement’s investigative abilities. Among new 
powers the PATRIOT Act gave to the FBI was the capability to obtain a warrant and conduct 
investigations and surveillance without first notifying the individual, in addition to delaying 
notification given proper conditions (Jones, 2009). As stated in Section 213 of the Act, providing 
immediate notification could be delayed if the court found reasonable cause that execution of the 
warrant may have an adverse result (USA PATRIOT Act, 2001). Furthermore, the PATRIOT 
Act allowed the government to issue a subpoena and acquire information from targets without 
conferring with a court of law (Jones, 2009). Significantly, the PATRIOT Act stated that, “ 
‘foreign intelligence information’ means information that relates to the national defense or the 
security of the United States” (USA PATRIOT Act, 2001). These semantics relaxed boundaries 
of the procedure and scope of intelligence operations (Jones, 2009). This permitted the FBI to 
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administer FISA in any way the agency believes applies to the context of national security 
(Jones, 2009). Other noteworthy changes resulting from the PATRIOT Act included enhanced 
surveillance procedures resulting in new pen register and trap and trace devices. This provided 
the government more authority to monitor telephone numbers received and called from specific 
telephone lines. 
Mukasey Guidelines 
  On December 1, 2008, Attorney General Michael Mukasey further modified the Attorney 
General Guidelines for terrorism investigations by consolidating FBI investigative guidelines 
under a single rubric. The issuance of the 2008 guidelines represented the pinnacle of the 
evolution of the FBI towards an intelligence agency rather than strictly being a law enforcement 
organization. More specifically, these guidelines outlined three types of terrorism investigations, 
including Assessments, Predicated Investigations, and Enterprise Investigations.  
Assessment investigations are to be used for the purpose of detecting, obtaining 
information about, or preventing or protecting against threats to national security or federal 
crimes (Mukasey, 2008). More specifically, they are to be used to detect and interrupt criminal 
activities at their early stages (Mukasey, 2008). Regarding authorization, assessments do not 
require any specific factual predication, only an “authorized purpose” and do not warrant 
approval by supervisors (Shields et al, 2009).  
Predicated Investigations are more restricted than assessments in that they require 
approval from a Special Agent in Charge or by an FBI Headquarters official (Mukasey, 2008). 
Additionally, predicated investigations require predication – “allegations, reports, facts or 
circumstances indicative of possible criminal or national security threatening activity” (Mukasey, 
2008, p.18). Predicated investigations are partitioned between preliminary investigations and full 
14 
investigations. Preliminary investigations can be commenced on any information or allegation 
indicative of possible national security or criminal threatening activity whereas full 
investigations require a more factual predication (Mukasey, 2008). Conversely, full 
investigations have no time limit, whereas preliminary investigations terminate after six months 
unless a SAC approves a six-month extension or FBI Headquarters approves an extension greater 
than one year (Mukasey, 2008).  
The final type of investigation approved in the 2008 Mukasey Guidelines is the 
Enterprise Investigation. Enterprise investigations are a form of full investigations, which 
generally examine the structure, scope, and nature of specific groups and organizations 
(Mukasey, 2008). While enterprise investigations require a factual predication, they are distinct 
in their focus on organizations and groups that may be involved in racketeering activity, 
terrorism, or other threats to national security (Mukasey, 2008).  
IV. Literature Review 
  Empirical terrorism analyses until recently have been somewhat limited, especially 
studies concerning the role of human intelligence in terrorism investigations. Nonetheless, a 
couple of studies have examined confidential informants and undercover agents. Shields (2012) 
and Greenberg (2011) looked at the prevalence of informants and agents, while Hewitt (2014) 
studied factors involved in preventing terrorism attacks and apprehending terrorist perpetrators. 
Confidential informants and undercover agents have also been referenced in relation to analyses 
of successful terrorist attacks and thwarted terrorism plots (Dahl, 2011; Strom, 2010;). 
  While empirical studies on the use of undercover agents and confidential informants 
within the context of terrorism investigations are scarce, Shields’ (2012) study of terrorism 
investigations and case outcomes found that the use of confidential informants dropped 
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significantly after 9/11. In particular, he found that 58% of court cases used confidential 
informants before 9/11, but only 20% of cases did so after 9/11 (2012). In addition, the average 
number of confidential informants used per case decreased from 4 informants pre 9/11 to 1.2 
informants post 9/11. The average level of assistance provided by confidential informants also 
decreased pre to post 9/11 from 2.71 to 2.00 (Shields, 2012)1.  
Interestingly, only one out of 25 terrorism investigations examined by Shields (2012) 
relied on an undercover agent in the three years following 9/11. Shields (2012) did note, 
however, that in cases filed prior to 9/11 there was an average of 2.67 undercover agents used in 
cases where at least one undercover agent was used. He also noted that these findings could 
significantly change when the remaining post 9/11 cases were coded and analyzed, but his 
findings did suggest that there was a significant shift in the pursuit of suspected terrorists by the 
government after 9/11.  
  In another study, Greenberg (2011) provides another look at the use of confidential 
informants in terrorism cases. Using all federal court cases that the Department of Justice labels 
as terror-related that were inspired by jihadist ideas, this study examined the use of informants 
from 2001-2009. Greenberg found that since 9/11, 41% of terrorism cases have involved 
confidential informants (2011). Similar to Shields findings, Greenberg (2011) found that from 
2002 to 2003, the same time that Attorney General Ashcroft’s guidelines took effect, that there 
was a consistent decrease in the use of informants. From 2003 to 2007, however, Greenberg 
found the proportion of terrorism cases involving an informant increased from 10% to 70%. That 
number decreased to just fewer than 30% from 2007-2008. In 2008, the year following 
                                                        
1 The level of assistance provided by confidential informants was measured on a scale from 1-4. 
1 = Information only, 2 = Recordings, 3 = Sworn testimony, and 4 = Recordings & sworn 
testimony. 
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implementation of the Mukasey Guidelines, the percentage increased back up to 70%. Finally, 
the 2009-2011 timeframe reveals that the percentage of cases involving informants reverted back 
to the 2001 level of 10% of cases.  
  More recently, Hewitt (2014) examined law-enforcement activities in 20 terrorism cases 
since 1968 and 38 cases of terrorism prevention since 9/11. The twenty completed acts of 
terrorism all resulted in at least one death. Hewitt (2014) used a seven-fold classification system 
of police actions to analyze the most successful tactics in identifying and apprehending 
perpetrators in these twenty cases. These factors included: crime scene, witness, routine policing, 
informers, surveillance, tips from the public, and rewards. Of the twenty completed terrorism 
cases examined by Hewitt (2014), ten were perpetrated by organized groups and ten cases were 
perpetrated by unaffiliated individuals, whether lone wolves or members of autonomous cells. 
Informants accounted for the second highest total of significant factors in identifying and 
apprehending terrorists in organized groups and the fourth highest total in identifying and 
apprehending terrorism by unaffiliated individuals (Hewitt, 2014). In total, informers had the 
second highest percentage (45%)2 of significant factors in identifying and apprehending terrorists 
for both organized and unaffiliated cases.   
  For the 38 terrorism plots thwarted after 9/11, Hewitt (2014) used a six-fold classification 
system of factors involved in the detection of plots. These factors included: routine policing, 
rewards, tips from the public, informants, surveillance, and undercover agents. The top two 
factors involved in detecting plots were undercover agents and informants, respectively. 
Together these two factors equaled 81% of the factors involved in detecting plots (Hewitt, 2014). 
                                                        
2 Since multiple factors influence the successful resolution of each completed terrorism case, 
percentages total to more than 100%, for a grand total of 230% (Hewitt, 2014). Since more than 
one factor could be involved in detecting plots, the total percent of factors add to more than 
100%, for a grand total of 131% (Hewitt, 2014). 
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Overall, Hewitt (2014) found that organized terrorist groups were most vulnerable to informers 
and surveillance, and that the most successful terrorist preventions involved undercover agents 
and informants. 
  As previous research shows, knowledge about the use of undercover agents and 
confidential informants is scarce. While several studies have analyzed the use of confidential 
informants in the past, their role in terrorism investigations since 2004 remains unclear. 
Additionally, the impact of the Mukasey Guidelines on the use of confidential informants 
remains unknown. Regarding undercover agents, very little is known about how they have been 
used in federal terrorism investigations since 2004.  
Success vs. Prevention 
  Since 9/11, the intelligence community has strived to refine ways to expose and prevent 
domestic terrorist schemes before they occur (Strom, 2010). The aforementioned Attorney 
General Guidelines and USA PATRIOT Act were measures taken by the government to assist 
the intelligence community in the prevention of terrorism after the 9/11 attacks. Since the goal of 
using undercover agents and confidential informants is to ultimately prevent terrorism incidents 
from occurring, it is important to review what is known about completed and prevented terrorism 
cases.  
  In one study, Strom (2010) study examined 86 prevented and completed terrorist plots 
against the U.S. from 1999 to 2009 and determined which activities and kinds of information that 
could either lead to or could have led to the discovery of the plot. Results from this study found 
that over 80% of thwarted terrorist schemes were uncovered by law enforcement or general 
public observations. Nearly one in five schemes were prevented “accidentally” through 
investigations of outwardly unassociated crimes, underscoring the need to understand when 
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regular crimes might be associated with terrorism (Strom, 2010). Approximately 40% of the 
foiled plots were the result of tips from confidential informants and the public. Overall, Strom 
found that investigating leads, along with information sharing among agencies, led to the 
prevention of the majority of terrorist schemes in his study. All 86 cases contained executed or 
planned acts of violence in which the defendants intended to cause casualties or catastrophic 
damage to critical infrastructure (Strom, 2010).  
  In 2011, Dahl examined 176 terrorist plots from 1987-2010 against American targets that 
were prevented or otherwise failed. The most significant finding from this study was that human 
intelligence collected from informants and tips received from members of the public were the 
most successful counterterrorism tools for breaking up domestic plots (Dahl, 2011). Of the 89 
domestic cases that were prevented, 66 involved either undercover agents or informants. Dahl 
(2011) found that most plots were foiled because officials had precise, tactical-level intelligence, 
often from human sources, on the activities of plotters.  
  Based on the findings of previous research, policy changes resulting from the events of 
September 11 may have significantly altered the use of undercover agents and confidential 
informants. Shields’ (2012) earlier investigations into the use of undercover agents and 
confidential informants in the years following 9/11 showed a decline in the use of human 
intelligence. Greenberg’s examination of informant’s post 9/11 revealed similar findings to 
Shields’, highlighting a decrease in use of informants right after September 11th. Additionally, 
Greenberg found an increase in the use of informants towards the end of the decade after 9/11. 
The usefulness of human intelligence was demonstrated in Strom (2010) and Dahl (2011), who 
found that a large percentage of prevented terrorism incidents resulted from cases involving 
either an undercover agent or confidential informant.  
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  Nonetheless, there are several shortcomings of prior literature on this topic. First, 
previous research is limited to descriptive analyses of the use of undercover agents in terrorism 
cases up to 2004 (Shields, 2012) and on confidential informants up to 2011 (Greenberg, 2011). 
Additionally, while Hewitt (2014) examined human intelligence in preventing terrorism, there is 
a dearth of research on the various types of case outcomes in cases involving human intelligence. 
  My contributions to this literature on the use of undercover agents and confidential 
informants, as well as thwarted terrorism plots, involves expanding the time frame in which 
cases involving human intelligence are examined. Additionally, I examine the categories of 
terrorism, the intended target type, the convictions rates, length of prison sentences, and amount 
of weapons, drugs, and ammunition seized in terrorism cases involving undercover agents and/or 
confidential informants. Doing so will significantly advance what is known about terrorism cases 
involving human intelligence in the U.S. following the 9/11 terrorist attacks. 
Theoretical Framework 
  Paul Wilkinson once quipped that, “Fighting terrorism is like being a goalkeeper. You 
can make a hundred brilliant saves but the only shot that people remember is the one that gets 
past you.” The American intelligence community has prevented numerous terrorism plots, 
however, the attack on September 11th remains the infamous event that failed to be thwarted. 
After 9/11, the FBI was criticized for having deficiencies and other weaknesses that prevented it 
from seamlessly sharing intelligence across organizational units (Zegart, 2007). While terrorism 
scholars have thus far focused mostly on issues of defining terrorism (Boyns & Ballard, 2009), 
several studies have applied criminological theory to causes of terrorism (Clark & Newman, 
2009), and the criminal justice response to terrorism (Smith & Damphousse, 1998; Shields, 
2012). Two related theories that will be used to explain possible changes in the intelligence 
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community and government responses to 9/11 are John Hagan’s Structural-Contextual Theory 
and Samuel Walker’s net-widening theory.  
Structural Contextual Theory 
A key premise of structural-contextual theory is that the criminal justice system is 
comprised of components that operate autonomously of one another (Hagan, 1989), or as a 
“loosely coupled” system. Under normal circumstances components of the justice system 
compete for resources and pursue different goals (Shields, 2012). However, Hagan suggested 
that when political power is directed towards particular types of crime, the justice system 
becomes tightly coupled (Hagan, 1989). The justice system may also direct political power 
towards specific types of crime in what Smith & Damphousse refer to as a “proactive political 
environment (Smith & Damphousse, 1998, p.71). A proactive political environment is described 
as, “contexts where the surrounding political environment has mandated departures from normal 
criminal justice operations” (Hagan, 1989, p.130). Thus, the criminal justice system moves from 
a reactive to a proactive system “targeting the prosecution of a particular form of crime and 
criminal” (Hagan, 1989: 130). Proactive political environments ultimately lead to the process of 
net-widening. Both the proactive political environment and net-widening occur after critical and 
high-profile events, such as the Oklahoma City Bombing or the September 11th attacks. Samuel 
Walker has furthered a net-widening perspective to explain the implementation of “get tough” 
laws and other responses to crime. The general idea behind these laws is that getting tougher on 
criminals will increase public safety by reducing crime victimization (Walker, 1998). Walker has 
argued, however, that get tough responses to crime also “widen the net” on those who might fall 
under the authority of the criminal justice system. In other words, get tough policies and 
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practices target lower level offenders who would not be arrested and adjudicated under normal 
circumstances (Walker, 1998).  
Organizational Resistance to Change 
As previously discussed, the events of 9/11 brought numerous policy changes to the 
American intelligence community, including the Ashcroft Guidelines, USA Patriot Act, and the 
Mukasey Guidelines.  
Despite these significant policy changes, there are reasons to expect that the FBI might 
revert back to proven methods the agency has used before the implementation of the Ashcroft 
Guidelines. This process can be explained by what Lipsky (1980) refers to as street-level 
bureaucracy, which suggests that street level actors, such as police, are active participants in 
policymaking and make choices based on experience and limited resources that may run counter 
to agencies’ policy objectives. Likewise, Maynard-Moody (2003) found that street level 
bureaucrats routinely engage in activities that “rub against” policies and rules because they 
believe them to be ineffective.   
The Department of Homeland Security has spent millions of dollars towards developing 
intelligence-led policing agencies (Jackson & Brown, 2007). Intelligence-led policing is an 
information-organizing process that allows law enforcement agencies to better understand their 
crime issues and account for available resources that will aid the decision making process as to 
what tactic or strategy will prevent crime, (i.e. terrorism) (Ratcliffe & Guidetti, 2008). 
Nonetheless, twenty-first-century technology and advanced analysis programs cannot serve as a 
substitute for human relationships (Taylor & Russell, 2012). Information collected by law 
enforcement through informants, undercover operatives and contacts with general citizens 
continue to be significant components in the fight against terrorism (Taylor & Russell, 2012).  
22 
If Lipsky and Maynard-Moody are correct, then we might expect to see SAC’s and FBI 
field offices faithfully adhere to the policy changes implemented by the Ashcroft and Mukasey 
Guidelines while the justice system is in a state of heightened coupling, but then revert back to 
previously tested and proven methods of investigation when the justice system begins to return to 
its normal state. In other words, though the AG Guidelines may have initially forced the FBI to 
engage in more proactive policing techniques, effectively sidelining the use of human 
intelligence, it is also possible that the street-level bureaucrats of the FBI field offices eventually 
reverted back to developing human intelligence leads.  
Applying Theory to Terrorism 
  Regarding terrorism, Smith and Damphousse (1998, p.73) suggest, “when a criminal act 
is officially designated by the polity as an act of terrorism, that designation sets in motion 
proactive law enforcement and prosecutorial techniques.” After a major event like 9/11, there is 
increased scrutiny from the media and public policy officials on members of the criminal justice 
system (Damphousse & Shields, 2007). Structural contextual theory would suggest that the 
events of 9/11 brought the criminal justice system from a group of loosely coupled components 
to a tightened group of components. These components may have previously worked 
independently of one another, but after 9/11, pressure from the war on terror would force 
agencies to work together towards the goal of terrorism prevention.  
With regard to terrorism policy after 9/11, Attorney General Ashcroft changed the way 
the FBI handled terrorism investigations. Prior to 9/11, the FBI used confidential informants and 
undercover agents to penetrate and take down terrorist groups from the inside. After 9/11, 
Ashcroft redirected domestic antiterrorism policy to intercept and disrupt terrorist organizations 
before their members could launch attacks (Shields et al, 2009). This resulted in the casting of a 
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wider net by law enforcement to arrest terrorists on less serious crimes, such as documentation 
and financial fraud, which before 9/11 was less of a priority. The results of this proactive 
environment and net-widening were demonstrated with the swiftly implemented policy changes 
to the Attorney General Guidelines in 2002. Nonetheless, street-level bureaucrats often reject 
new or modified rules and policies when they believe them to be unsuccessful (Maynard-Moody, 
2003). Thus, I expect that FBI agents would abide by the Ashcroft Guidelines when the justice 
system is in a tightly coupled state, but then default back to successful tactics and strategies of 
preventing terrorism through the use of human intelligence when the justice system becomes 
more loosely coupled. Since the Mukasey Guidelines did not change the FBI’s investigative 
mandate, but only bolstered investigative powers, it may be expected that the FBI’s use of using 
human intelligence to prevent terrorism will increase after the 2008 guidelines implementation. 
Following the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, which called for 
increased emphasis on human intelligence gathering, and continuing with the FBI’s push to 
expand the use of confidential informants in 2007 (FBI, 2007), I expect the proportion of 
confidential informants to increase in the middle of the decade, despite diminished impact of 
tightened coupling as fear decreases and the adoption of the Mukasey guidelines (as they 
bolstered the FBI’s investigative power, but did not change its nature). 
V. Research Questions 
Research Question 1 
  The way the FBI conducted terrorism investigations was dramatically altered due to 
policy changes after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The fear from 9/11 created a tightly coupled 
justice system and forced law enforcement personnel to engage in policing activities that 
widened the net of potential terrorist suspects. Additionally, changes where made regarding the 
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use of one of the FBI’s most successful counterterrorism tools, the use of human intelligence. 
This purpose of this study is to examine whether policy changes after 9/11 influenced the FBI’s 
use of human intelligence and if so, what effects has that had on terrorism case outcomes.  
1. How did the Ashcroft and Mukasey Attorney General Guidelines change the use of 
undercover agents and confidential informants? 
      The Ashcroft Guidelines changed the FBI from a reactive agency to a proactive 
agency. Previously, the FBI’s strategy was to penetrate and take down the leaders of terrorist 
groups, whereas the 2002 Guidelines shifted the focus to targeting subordinate group members. 
The FBI accomplished this new goal by arresting and prosecuting terrorists earlier and more 
often to prevent attacks from being planned or attempted (Shields, 2012). In doing so, ostensibly, 
the FBI would have less time to infiltrate groups and gain human intelligence. By the time the 
2008 Mukasey Guidelines came into effect, fear from 9/11 that caused the early intervention and 
arrest mandates should have subsided, and as noted above, new policy initiatives had been put in 
place focusing more attention on human intelligence, returning infiltration strategies to pre-9/11 
levels. To test whether this is the case using structural contextual theory, I developed the 
following hypotheses:  
H1= The proportion of cases by year that used undercover agents and/or confidential 
informants will be lower in the Ashcroft Guidelines era (2002-2007) than in the pre-Ashcroft 
Guidelines era (1980-2001) or Mukasey era (2008-present).  
H2= The average number of undercover agents and/or confidential informants used per 
case will be lower in the Ashcroft Guidelines era (2002-2007) than in the pre-Ashcroft 
Guidelines era (1980-2002) or Mukasey era (2008-present). 
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If tightened coupling is not a permanent effect, as suggested by Damphousse and Shields 
(2007), and Lipsky is correct in that street-level bureaucrats often choose to revert to proven 
methods of police work, then I would expect the proportion of cases involving confidential 
informants and undercover agents to increase in the latter half of the Ashcroft guidelines (2006 
and 2007). To examine this effect, I will test the following hypothesis: 
H3= The proportion of cases using undercover agents and/or confidential informants will 
increase in the latter half of Ashcroft Guidelines era (2006-2007).  
  Given the fear that gripped America following the attacks on 9/11, which would, in 
theory, create a proactive political environment, and given the policy shift towards proactive law 
enforcement, we would expect the government to have less time to develop human intelligence 
in the post-Ashcroft Guideline era.  That should negatively impact the proportion of cases using 
confidential informants and undercover agents overall. However, as the attacks were perpetrated 
by Islamic extremists, we might expect the government to devote more resources to this 
particular threat compared to right-wing, environmental, and leftist terrorist groups. Therefore, 
the proportion of Islamic extremist cases using confidential informants and undercover agents 
should be higher in the post-Ashcroft era than before 9/11 or after implementation of the 
Mukasey guidelines. Therefore, I will test the following hypothesis: 
H4= The proportion of cases that make use of confidential informants and/or undercover 
agents will be higher among Islamic Extremist cases than among non-Islamic Extremist cases 
during the Ashcroft Guidelines era  (2002-2007) compared to prior and subsequent eras.  
  Prior to 9/11, Al-Qaeda and associated movements typically attacked American 
embassies, warships, and military bases (Bergen et al, 2011). After 9/11, these targets increased 
security measures, thus forcing Al-Qaeda to attack “soft” economic and business targets that are 
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easier to hit and ever-present (Bergen et al, 2011). By the time the 2008 Mukasey Guidelines 
came into effect, fear for the security of government and military targets should have subsided 
whereas fear for the safety of “soft” targets should have increased. Based on this information, I 
developed the following hypothesis: 
H5= The proportion of cases involving undercover agents and/or confidential informants 
with planned attacks targeting government and military facilities will be lower in the Mukasey 
era (2008-present) compared with the Ashcroft Guidelines era (2002-2007) and the pre-Ashcroft 
Guidelines era (1980-2001), while planned attacks against economic and business targets will be 
higher in the Mukasey era (2008-present) compared with the Ashcroft Guidelines era (2002-
2007) and the pre-Ashcroft Guidelines era (1980-2001).  
  The Ashcroft Guidelines caused the FBI to aggressively arrest and prosecute terrorists at 
a quicker rate than had ever been done. This essentially gave the FBI less time to use undercover 
agents and/or confidential informants to infiltrate groups. This also likely allowed for undercover 
agents and/or confidential informants to have less time to collect evidence against terrorists due 
to quick prosecution demands. By the time the 2008 Mukasey Guidelines came into effect, the 
impact of tightened coupling might have subsided and street-level bureaucracy may have altered 
the use of proactive policies, giving undercover agents and confidential informants more time to 
collect evidence. To test this reasoning, I created the following hypothesis: 
H6= The average level of assistance provided by undercover agents and/or confidential 
informants will be lower in the Ashcroft Guidelines era (2002-2007) than in the pre-Ashcroft 
Guidelines era (1980-2001) or Mukasey era (2008-present). 
  The Ashcroft Guidelines mandated that the FBI intervene early and prosecute 
aggressively. This mandate gave the FBI less time to infiltrate terrorist groups with human 
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intelligence. Moreover, in cases where the FBI had time to infiltrate a group, they likely had less 
time to collect evidence and set up stings in order to maximize prosecution chances of a 
conviction with numerous charges from defendants being caught with drugs or weapons. By the 
time the 2008 Mukasey Guidelines came into effect, the system may have become more loosely 
coupled. With loosened time restrictions, undercover agents and confidential informants should 
have been able to collect evidence and set up sting operations that maximized the charges 
prosecutors could use against defendants who were in possession of illegal drugs and weapons at 
the time of arrest. Based on this information, I developed the following hypothesis: 
Research Question 2 
Assuming the FBI and the criminal justice system followed Attorney General John 
Ashcroft’s guidelines to intervene early and prosecute aggressively, cases that used undercover 
agents and confidential informants may have been handled differently than cases not involving 
human intelligence. To analyze this issue, I created the following research question.  
2. What impact, if any, have the changes in use of undercover agents and confidential 
informants had on case processing and outcomes? 
The FBI’s change from a proactive to a reactive agency affected both the goals and the 
abilities of the FBI. Most significant was the early intervention strategy to prevent terrorism. To 
accomplish this, law enforcement agents had to arrest terrorists quicker and prosecutors had to 
convict terrorists sooner than before the Ashcroft Guidelines were put in place. Quicker arrest 
rates are likely to result in less serious crimes prosecuted as criminals will be caught in the early 
stages of terroristic activities. The prosecution of less serious crimes should be reflected through 
lower count severities. With less serious charges to prove a defendant was guilty beyond a 
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reasonable doubt, prosecutors should be able to more easily convict defendants. To examine this, 
I created the following hypothesis: 
H8= Cases with undercover agents and/or confidential informants will result in higher 
conviction rates than cases without undercover agents and/or confidential informants and 
conviction rates will be higher in the Ashcroft Guidelines era (2002-2007) than in the pre-
Ashcroft Guidelines era (1980-2001) or Mukasey era (2008-present). 
The Ashcroft Guidelines called for the early arrests and prosecutions of terrorists. To 
make this happen, the FBI had to arrest terrorists on less serious crimes, such as documentation 
and financial fraud. The prosecution of less serious crimes such as these should result in less 
serious sentences. Given the expectation of shorter prison sentences in cases post-Ashcroft 
Guidelines, however, the use of undercover agents and confidential informants typically involves 
more serious situations where the agent or informer is able to gather evidence against the 
defendant(s). Therefore, it is likely that cases involving undercover agents and confidential 
informants will feature a greater amount of evidence and will result in longer prison sentences 
than cases without human intelligence. Based on this reasoning, I developed the following 
hypothesis:  
H9= Cases with undercover agents and/or confidential informants will result in longer 
prison sentences than cases without undercover agents and/or confidential informants and cases 
during the Ashcroft Guidelines era (2002-2007) will have shorter prison sentences than cases in 
the pre-Ashcroft Guidelines era (1980-2001) or Mukasey era (2008-present). 
The ultimate purpose of undercover agents and confidential informants is to aid in the 
prevention of terrorism, whether that is through gathering information or collecting evidence. 
Since agents and informants put their lives at risk with these duties, and numerous resources 
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including time and money are invested towards their efforts, the government would not use 
human intelligence if there were not a high chance of being successful. Moreover, undercover 
agents and confidential informants are embedded in terrorist groups where they gain knowledge 
of future plots, just as any other member would. This knowledge should allow the infiltrator to 
alert authorities before any successful plots are attempted. To analyze this reasoning, the 
following hypothesis was created: 
H10= Cases with undercover agents and/or confidential informants will result in a higher 




This study uses data from the American Terrorism Study (ATS), which is housed in the 
Fulbright College at the University of Arkansas (Smith & Damphousse, 2000; Smith, 2001). The 
ATS was created to collect information specifically on American terrorism in order to form a 
database that could be empirically tested to enrich criminologists’ and policy makers’ 
understanding of terrorism. The Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Terrorist Research and 
Analytical Center provided the name of persons indicted under the FBI’s counterterrorism 
program dating back to 1980. Using these, and subsequent lists of cases, the ATS is comprised of 
federal court cases upon which at least one person was investigated under a terrorism 
investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and later indicted in federal court. Thus, the 
primary source of the American Terrorism Study’s data is federal court documents. Numerous 
government funded grant projects have relied on the ATS to examine a variety of terrorism 
issues including geospatial and pre-incident indicators of terrorist activities, prosecutorial and 
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defense strategies in terrorism trials, and geographic concentrations of violent extremism and 
terrorism in the United States. Data from the ATS are housed in an Oracle relational database. 
While the ATS currently contains 443 court cases, this study focuses on the 156 cases that have 
been infiltrated by undercover agents and/or confidential informants.  
Sorting Variables 
To conduct the majority of my analyses, I created two sorting variables from which I 
separated the data into different temporal samples. The first sorting variable is referred to as 
Time Period. Time Period is a categorical variable that separates all ATS cases into three groups.  
The first group is composed of persons indicted before the implementation of the Ashcroft 
Attorney General Guidelines in 2002. The second group contains persons that resulted in 
indictment between 2002 and 2007, or the time period in which the Ashcroft Guidelines were in 
effect. The third sample includes cases resulting in indictment between 2008 and 2014, when the 
Mukasey Guidelines superseded the Ashcroft guidelines. The second sorting variable I created is 
called Ashcroft Time Period. Ashcroft Time Period measures the proportion of cases using 
confidential informants and undercover agents throughout the Ashcroft era based on two 
samples. The first sample represents the earlier Ashcroft Guidelines era (2002-2005) and the 
second sample represents the later Ashcroft Guidelines era (2006-2007). 
Undercover Operative Variables 
As a central focus of this study is undercover agents and confidential informants, I have 
several variables related to the use of undercover operatives. First, to measure the year a case 
involving undercover agents and confidential informants occurred, I used the variable Infiltrated. 
Infiltrated is a dichotomous variable that measures whether cases used an undercover agent 
and/or a confidential informant. I coded cases that used an undercover agent and/or a 
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confidential informant as 1, while all other cases were coded as 0. Second, I measured 
undercover agents and confidential informants using the variables Undercover Agent and 
Informant, respectively. Undercover Agent is a dichotomous variable that measures whether a 
government agent infiltrated the group.  Informant is a dichotomous variable that measures 
whether the government had a confidential informant who was a member of the group or closely 
associated with the group. I coded cases involving an undercover agent as 1, while all other cases 
were coded as 0. I also coded cases in which a confidential informant was used as 1, and all other 
cases were coded as 0. Third, I used the variables Informant Number and Undercover Number to 
measure how many confidential informants and undercover agents were involved in each case, 
respectively. Informant Number is a ratio level variable and measures how many confidential 
informants the government used. Undercover Number is also a ratio level variable and measures 
how many undercover agents the government used. I analyzed only cases in which at least one 
confidential informant and/or undercover agent, and values for both variables ranged from 1 to 
10. Fourth, in order to measure the average level of assistance provided by undercover agents 
and confidential informants, I used the variables Undercover Assistance and Informant 
Assistance. Undercover Assistance measures the level of assistance provided by a government 
agent. It is an ordinal level variable (provided some information, but no recording or testimony 
(1), provided recorded conversations (2), provided sworn testimony (3), provided both sworn 
testimony and recorded conversations (4)). Informant Assistance is also an ordinal level variable 
and is coded in the same way as Undercover Assistance.  
Case Processing and Outcome Variables 
I have three variables (Convicted, Prison Sentence, Prevented Incident) that measure how 
court cases were processed and what their outcomes were. To measure conviction rates I created 
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a dichotomous variable that I called Convicted. In this variable, cases were coded as 1 where a 
conviction of any type occurred and all other instances were coded as 0. To measure prison 
sentences I created the variable Prison Sentence. Prison Sentence is a ratio level variable that 
measures the sentence length in months of prison that a defendant receives. This variable was 
recoded to give the death penalty and life sentences numerical values. I ran a frequency 
distribution to determine the longest sentence in months of defendants in my sample, which was 
2880 months. I then added one month to that sentence for the death penalty value and life 
sentence value to give each of those the values of 2881 and 2882, respectively. In order to assess 
the prevention of incidents, I used the variable Prevented Incident. Prevented Incident is a 
dichotomous variable that measures whether an attack was prevented or not as result of human 
intervention. I coded cases that contained no prevented incidents as 0 and cases that contained a 
prevented incident as 1.  
Other Variables 
In relation to my outcome variable Convicted, I have two control variables that were 
used. These variables are Count Severity and Prosecution Strategy. Count Severity and 
Prosecution Strategy were used to determine the conviction rate in infiltrated cases across the 
three Attorney General Guidelines eras. Count Severity is an interval level variable that measures 
the severity of every count a defendant is charged with. It is coded as 1-29 on a scale that 
increases in severity. Prosecution Strategy is an ordinal level variable that measures the 
prosecution strategy used against a defendant. There are three prosecution strategy categories: 
conventional criminality, political innuendo and explicit politicality, coded as 1, 2 and 3 
respectively. Conventional Criminality involves cases where the defendant is not linked to a 
terrorist group or a terrorist act and is charged with conventional criminal charges (Shields, 
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2012). Political Innuendo involves cases where the defendant is linked to a terrorist group or 
terrorist act and is charged with conventional crimes. The last prosecution strategy, explicit 
politicality- involves cases where the defendants motive for committing a crime is questioned 
and where the defendant is linked to a terrorist group outright (Shields, 2012).  
I also created a variable called Category. This variable measures the category of terrorism 
and is a nominal level variable, (Environmental (1), Far-left (2), Far-right (3), Islamic Extremist 
(4)).  
Finally, I created the variable Intended Target. Intended Target is the primary target that 
a group or individual intended to attack but was unsuccessful in doing so. Intended Target is a 
nominal level variable, and was recoded into a categorical variable (financial (1), government 
(2), military (3), business (4), private property (5), transportation (6), and other (7)).  
VII. Results 
Analysis and Findings 
The findings for this study are presented below and organized by the two research 
questions and the ten corresponding hypotheses. Bivariate statistical test (chi-square, ANOVA) 
are used to test each hypothesis. Table 1 represents descriptive statistics for the study. Frequency 
distributions from Table 1 show that the American Terrorism Study database contains 443 cases 
that meet my inclusion criteria. I divided those cases into eras corresponding to the different 
Attorney General Guidelines. This resulted in a sample of 397 cases, as it was not known if an 
undercover operative was used in 46 cases of the original sample. The Pre-Ashcroft Era 
contained 150 cases, the Ashcroft Era contained 172 cases, and the Mukasey Era contained 75 
cases. Furthermore, in the sample of 397 Attorney General Guidelines Era cases, 156 cases 
(39.3%) contained a confidential informant, an undercover agent, or both. The Pre-Ashcroft era 
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comprised the majority of cases infiltrated by operatives (65%) followed by the Ashcroft (24%) 
and Mukasey (23%) eras, respectively.  
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics  
Variables N (Percent) 
American Terrorism Study Cases 443 
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Conviction Rate: Infiltrated vs. Non-Infiltrated Cases 
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222 (73 months) 
142 (336 months) 
 
Research Question 1 
How did the Ashcroft & Mukasey Attorney General Guidelines change the use of 
undercover agents and confidential informants?  
Hypothesis 1 
Hypothesis one tested for differences in the use of undercover operatives throughout 
different time periods. Specifically, I hypothesized that the proportion of cases that used 
undercover agents and/or confidential informants would be lower in the Ashcroft Guidelines era 
(2002-2007) than in the pre-Ashcroft Guidelines era (1980-2001) or the Mukasey era (2008-
2014). Findings from testing this hypothesis are presented in Table 2, and partially support my 
hypothesis. Results indicate that the proportion of cases with undercover operatives was 
significantly lower in the Ashcroft era than the pre-Ashcroft era, however, the proportion of 
cases with undercover operatives in the Ashcroft era was nearly identical to the proportion of 
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cases with undercover operatives in the Mukasey era. The pre-Ashcroft era had 64.7% of cases 
containing operatives that dramatically decreased to 23.7% of cases in the Ashcroft era (p <.05) 
and then remained stable at 22.7% of cases in the Mukasey era (p <.05).  
Table 2: Crosstabulation of AGG Eras in Infiltrated Cases 
Era No Operative Operative Used % Of Cases with 
Operative 
Pre-Ashcroft 53 97 64.7 % 
Ashcroft 131 41 23.8 % 
Mukasey 58 17 22.7 % 
 
Chi-Square = 66.54   Df = 2   p < .05 
 
Hypothesis 2 
Table 3 represents ANOVA results comparing the average number of confidential 
informants and undercover agents used in cases throughout the pre-Ashcroft, Ashcroft and 
Mukasey eras. I hypothesized that the average number of undercover operatives would be the 
lowest in the Ashcroft Guidelines era. Counter to my hypothesis, the average number of 
informants was the highest during the Ashcroft era. The average number of undercover agents 
during the Ashcroft era was in-between the other two eras. The findings did not support my 
hypothesis, but the findings were statistically significant. 
Table 3: ANOVA of Avg # of Informants and Undercover Agents Per Case 
 Era N Mean Sig. Df 
Informant   Pre-Ashcroft 79 2.02 .000 2 
   Ashcroft 36 4.05   
   Mukasey 12 1.08   
       
Undercover   Pre-Ashcroft 38 1.94 .010 2 
   Ashcroft 6 1.16   






In hypothesis three I examined the Ashcroft era in depth by dividing it into two time 
periods, 2002-2005 and 2006-2007. I hypothesized that the latter half of the Ashcroft Guidelines 
era would feature a greater proportion of cases that used undercover operatives. Results 
supported the hypothesis and were statistically significant. I found that the proportion of cases 
using operatives dramatically increased from 16% during the 2002-2005 time frame to 64% 
during the 2006-2007 time frame. 
Table 4: Crosstabulation of Ashcroft Era Divided in Infiltrated Cases 
Era No Operative Operative Used % Of Cases with 
Operative 
2002-2005 121 23 16 % 
2006-2007 10 18 64 % 
 
Chi-Square = 30.319   Df = 1   p < .05 
 
Hypothesis 4 
Table 5 represents crosstabulation results examining different categories of terrorism and 
levels of case infiltration. I hypothesized that Islamic Extremist cases would have the highest 
proportion of cases involving undercover operatives compared to cases in other categories of 
terrorism. The findings did not support hypothesis four. Statistically, Far-Left terrorism 
contained the highest proportion of cases that used undercover operatives, at 100%, however, 
there was only one Far-Left terrorism case in the sample. Islamic Extremist cases contained a 
nearly identical proportion of cases using undercover operatives as Far-Right cases at 24.0% and 





Table 5: Crosstabulation of Category of Terrorism in Infiltrated Cases 
Category No Operative Operative Used % Of Cases with 
Operative 
Environmental 11 18 62    % 
Far-Left 0 1 100  % 
Far-Right 25 8 24.0 % 
Islamic Extremist 19 6 24.2 % 
 
Chi-Square = 13.554   Df = 3   p < .05 
 
Hypothesis 5 
In hypothesis five, I examined the intended target type in infiltrated cases across the three 
Attorney General Guidelines Eras. I hypothesized that the proportion of cases involving 
undercover operatives (both confidential informants and undercover agents) with the planned 
attacks targeting government and military facilities would be the lowest during the Mukasey era, 
while planned attacks against economic and business targets would be the highest during the 
Mukasey era. The results did not support the hypothesis. The Mukasey era did have the lowest 
proportion of infiltrated cases with the intended target being government or military facilities as 
well as the highest proportion of cases with business targets; however, the findings were not 
statistically significant at the .05 level.   
Table 6: Crosstabulation of Intended Targets in Infiltrated Cases 
Era Government Military Business 
Pre-Ashcroft 46 % 5 % 15 % 
Ashcroft 33 % 8 % 16 % 
Mukasey 28 % 0 % 28 % 
 
Chi-Square = 9.069   Df = 10   Sig. = NS 
 
Hypothesis 6 
Table 7 represents ANOVA results comparing the average level of assistance provided by 
undercover agents across the three Attorney General Guidelines Eras. In addition, I performed a 
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second ANOVA to measure the level of assistance provided by confidential informants. I 
hypothesized that the average level of assistance provided by either undercover agents or 
confidential informants would be the lowest during the Ashcroft Guidelines. The findings 
partially supported the hypothesis. I found that informants provided the highest level of 
assistance during the Ashcroft era and that this result was non-significant. In support of the 
hypothesis, I found that undercover agents had the lowest level of assistance during the Ashcroft 
era and that this was statistically significant.  
 
 Table 7: ANOVA of Informant and Undercover Assistance 
 Era N Mean Sig. Df 
Informant   Pre-Ashcroft 74 2.39 .520 2 
   Ashcroft 36 2.55   
   Mukasey 9 2.11   
       
Undercover   Pre-Ashcroft 38 3.52 .012 2 
   Ashcroft 5 2.40   
   Mukasey 7 2.57   
 
Research Question 2 
What impact, if any, have the changes in use of undercover agents and confidential 
informants had on case processing and outcomes? 
Hypothesis 8 
I hypothesized that cases with undercover operatives would result in higher conviction 
rates than cases without undercover operatives and that conviction rates among the three 
Attorney General Guidelines eras would be highest in the Ashcroft era. I first used an 
independent samples t-test to find the conviction rate percentage in both types of cases (See 
Table 8a). The t-test results did not support the hypothesis and showed that the conviction rate in 
cases with undercover operatives was 75%, whereas the conviction rate in cases without 
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undercover operatives was 86% (p < .05). Next, I ran a one-way ANOVA test to compare the 
conviction rate in infiltrated cases across the three Attorney General Guidelines eras (See Table 
8b). The ANOVA results, however, were not statistically significant between Attorney General 
Guidelines eras (p >.05). I then ran logistic regression controlling for count severity and 
prosecution strategy to measure the significance of undercover operatives on conviction rates 
(See Table 8c).  The Hosmer/Lemeshow Chi-Square indicated that there were no fitness 
problems, but the percentage of explained variance did not increase beyond the initial model. 
Count severity was not significant when controlling for prosecution strategy and infiltration, and 
infiltration was not significant when controlling for count severity and prosecution strategy, 
though it was very close (.059) with a negative impact on the likelihood of conviction. The only 
significant variable was prosecution strategy; consistent with prior research, the more politicized 
the case became the greater the log odds that there would not be a conviction. The Nagelkerke 
value shows that only 6.5% of the variation in conviction outcomes in my model can be 
explained by count severity, prosecution strategy and infiltration.  
Table 8a: Independent Samples T-Test of Conviction Rates in Infiltrated Cases  
 N Mean Std. Deviation 
No Operative 349 .86 .338 
Operative Used 491 .75 .430 
 
                                                t = 4.073   Df = 838   p < .05 
 
Table 8b: ANOVA of Conviction Rates in Infiltrated Cases 
Era N Mean Sig. Df 
Pre-Ashcroft 168 .78 .070 2 
Ashcroft 19 .63   





Table 8c: Logistic Regression of Conviction Rates in Infiltrated Cases  
 B Df Sig. Exp(B) 
Count Severity -.004 1 .620 .996 
Conventional  2 .001  
Innuendo -.681 1 .018 .506 
Explicit  -1.009 1 .000 .364 
Infiltrate -.406 1 .059 .666 
Nagelkerke = .065 




Table 9a represents independent samples t-test results of the average prison sentence 
length in months in cases with undercover operatives compared to cases without undercover 
operatives. I hypothesized that cases with undercover operatives would result in longer prison 
sentences than cases without undercover operatives (See Table 9a). The results support the 
hypothesis and are statistically significant, but I report these findings with a caveat. In order to 
properly measure sentence lengths, prior research indicates that I should control for overall case 
severity and prior criminal history. Ideally, I would have done so, but very few cases in the post-
9/11 are available for these variables. I found that cases with undercover operatives have an 
average prison sentence of 336 months whereas cases that do not use undercover operatives have 
an average prison sentence of 73 months. Additionally, I ran a one-way ANOVA test to compare 
the prison sentence lengths in infiltrated cases across the three Attorney General Guidelines eras 
(See Table 9b). I hypothesized that cases during the Ashcroft era would have the shortest prison 
sentences among the three eras. The ANOVA results were statistically significant between 
Attorney General Guidelines eras with defendants in the Ashcroft era having the lowest average 




Table 9a: Independent Samples T-Test of Prison Sentences in Infiltrated Cases 
 N Mean 
Cases No Operative 302 73 
Cases With Operative 433 336 
 
t = -3.844   Df = 733   p < .05 
 
Table 9b: ANOVA of Prison Sentences in Infiltrated Cases 
Era N Mean Sig. Df 
Pre-Ashcroft 464 265 .000 2 
Ashcroft 265 72   
Mukasey 90 115   
 
Hypothesis 10 
In hypothesis ten, I examined prevented incidents in both cases with and without 
undercover operatives. I hypothesized that cases with undercover operatives would result in a 
higher percentage of prevented incidents than cases without undercover operatives. The findings 
support the hypothesis and were statistically significant (See Table 10). I found that 23% of cases 
without undercover operatives contained a prevented incident whereas 27% of cases with 
undercover operatives contained a prevented incident.  











Chi-Square = 44.626   Df = 2   p < .05 
 
VIII. Discussion 
The events of 9/11 were the stimulus needed to change America’s counterterrorism 
efforts. As a response to that infamous day, some of the major changes the U.S. government 
made were policy related, most significantly the Ashcroft Attorney General Guidelines. The 
FBI’s investigative scope was expanded through the Ashcroft Guidelines, ultimately changing 
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the mission of the FBI from a reactive to a proactive agency and making counterterrorism its top 
priority. The purpose of this study was to explore the relationship of policy changes on the use of 
undercover operatives. Specifically, this study sought to determine whether the Attorney General 
Guidelines that were implemented after 9/11 changed the use of undercover agents and 
confidential informants in federal terrorism cases. Additionally, this study had the goal of 
examining what impact, if any, the changes in use of undercover operatives had on case 
processing and outcomes. The results of my analyses were mixed in providing support for my 
hypotheses.  
Research Question 1 
My first research question was designed to explore the influence of the 2002 and 2008 
Attorney General Guidelines in terrorism cases that used undercover agents and confidential 
informants. I predicted that the Ashcroft Guidelines era would have the lowest proportion of 
cases that used undercover operatives compared to the pre-Ashcroft Guidelines era and the 
Mukasey era. I found a statistically significant decrease in the proportion of cases that used 
undercover operatives from the pre-Ashcroft era to the Ashcroft era (64% to 23%). However, the 
Ashcroft era contained a slightly higher proportion of cases that used undercover operatives than 
the Mukasey era (23% to 22%). These findings suggest that the FBI’s counterterrorism goals via 
the Ashcroft Guidelines to arrest and prosecute terrorists earlier and more often were successful. 
These results do not suggest, however, that by the time the Mukasey Guidelines came into effect, 
fear, driven by the 9/11 attacks that caused the early intervention and arrest mandates, had 
subsided returning infiltration strategies and levels to what they were pre 9/11. While the justice 
system may still be in a state of tightened coupling causing a low proportion of Mukasey era 
cases to contain undercover operatives, the findings may be reflective of an absence of cases that 
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await coding in the American Terrorism Study database. I ran a frequency distribution of the 
number of infiltrated cases by year. There were 9 infiltrated cases in 2010 and 6 infiltrated cases 
in 2011. These high numbers of infiltrated cases suggest that the Mukasey era may actually 
contain a higher proportion of cases that used undercover operatives than the Ashcroft era as 
there are numerous cases from the last five years still being coded and entered into the ATS 
database.  
Regarding the average number of undercover agents and confidential informants used per 
case, I hypothesized that the Ashcroft era would have the lowest average number of undercover 
operatives used among the three eras. The results indicated cases in the Aschroft era had neither 
the lowest average number of informants nor agents.  In fact, Aschroft era cases had the highest 
number of confidential informants as compared to the Mukasey era. After closer examination of 
the cases during this time period, I found 14 related cases where informants were used in 2006, 
and each of those cases featured eight confidential informants—the same informants. These 14 
cases are collectively known as the “ELF Family,” and involved numerous defendants in 
multiple cases, some of whom turned states evidence and testified against their fellow Earth 
Liberation Front (ELF) members to mitigate their sentences. Thus, the ELF Family case study 
likely skews the number of informants per case, which makes the analysis of undercover agents a 
more accurate depiction of the average number of operatives used during the guidelines. 
Nonetheless, the Ashcroft era contained an average of 1.16 agents whereas the Mukasey era 
contained an average of 1.00 agents indicating a minimal change between time periods, at least 
among those cases currently coded. While the Ashcroft era did not contain the lowest average 
number of undercover agents, it was significantly less than the average number of agents used in 
the Pre-Ashcroft era (1.16 to 1.94 agents). This decrease from nearly 2 agents to 1 agent per case 
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is likely the result of early arrest and prosecution strategies brought on by the justice system 
being tightly coupled.  
Turning to the category of terrorism, I hypothesized that Islamic Extremist cases would 
have the highest proportion of cases with undercover operatives compared to other categories of 
terrorism during the Ashcroft era. Not counting the Far-Left typology, as there was only one 
valid case, Environmental cases had the highest proportion, at 62%, whereas Far-Right and 
Islamic Extremist cases were proportionate to one another at 24.2% and 24.0%, respectively. It 
could be argued that the ELF Family cases skew results for this hypothesis as well. However, 
even by excluding the 14 ELF Family cases, the proportion of Environmental cases that used 
undercover operatives is still the highest at 26.6%. A possible explanation for why 
Environmental terrorism had the highest proportion of cases involving undercover operatives 
may be a reflection of the organizational structure and tactics of the Earth Liberation Front. ELF 
operates under a leaderless resistance model and the Ashcroft Guidelines changed the FBI’s 
tactics from targeting group leaders prior to 9/11 to targeting subordinate group members after 
9/11(Joosse, 2007). With little to no established groups and/or group members to maintain 
loyalty to, it is likely easier for defendant’s to turn states evidence on any other environmental 
terrorists they may know to receive a better sentence in court. Likewise, it is likely also easier for 
the FBI to establish informants to single individuals to gain their trust rather than attempting to 
gain the trust of an entire terrorist group. Thus, the FBI’s post 9/11 counterterrorism strategy 
directly aligned with how environmental terrorists operated. Structural contextual theory would 
suggest that the FBI would have established undercover operatives in a greater proportion of 
Islamic extremist cases due to the involvement of Islamic extremists in the 9/11 attacks. 
However, the Ashcroft Guidelines demand for early intervention in terrorism cases aligned with 
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the tactics of environmental terrorists more so than Islamic extremists, represented by the higher 
proportion of environmental terrorism cases.  
Concerning the intended target type in infiltrated cases, I hypothesized that the Mukasey 
era would have the lowest proportion of infiltrated cases that featured government and military 
facility targets, and that the Mukasey era cases would have the highest proportion of business 
targets. While there were no statistically significant differences between the three eras (sig. = 
.526) regarding actual targets, the Mukasey era did have the lowest proportion of infiltrated cases 
where the target in the case was a government or military facility. The Mukasey era cases also 
contained the highest proportion of cases where the target in the case was a business target. 
These findings, while not significant, coincide with prior literature on terrorist group tactics post 
9/11. As Bergen et al (2011) found, terrorists have shifted from attacking hard targets such as 
American embassies, warships, and military bases, which are better defended after 9/11, to 
attacking soft targets such as economic and business organizations. While structural contextual 
theory does not explain terrorist behaviors, it may suggest why terrorist tactics have changed 
after 9/11. The fear from 9/11, with the Pentagon being attacked and potentially the nation’s 
capitol being targeted, left the justice system believing that it was only a matter of time before 
the next government or military facility was attacked. Thus, when the justice system was tightly 
coupled, it worked together to increase security on both government and military facilities while 
security measures for economic and business organizations remain relatively unchanged.  
When I examined the average level of assistance provided by confidential informants and 
undercover agents, I hypothesized that the Ashcroft era would have the lowest level of assistance 
for both types of undercover operatives. Regarding informants, there was no statistical difference 
between eras. Undercover agents, however, did provide the lowest average level of assistance 
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during the Ashcroft era, supporting my hypothesis, and providing evidence of structural 
contextual theory in effect after 9/11. This finding represents another example of how fear from 
the 9/11 attacks caused the criminal justice system to become tightly coupled. Undercover agents 
provided less assistance during the Ashcroft era, which represented a change in FBI 
investigations which stemming from the Ashcroft Guidelines demanding arrests earlier and more 
often, thus giving undercover agents less time to collect evidence.  
Research Question 2 
My second research question was created to measure what impact, if any, the changes in 
the use of undercover operatives had on case processing and outcomes. Looking at conviction 
rates, I hypothesized that cases with undercover operatives would have higher conviction rates 
than cases without operatives, and that the Ashcroft Guidelines era would have the highest rate 
of convictions among the three eras. None of my findings supported this hypothesis. Conviction 
rates were 11% higher in cases that did not use undercover operatives. Furthermore, results were 
not significant (p >.05) concerning the conviction rates between Attorney General Guidelines 
eras. Additionally, when I examined conviction rates controlling for count severity and 
prosecution strategy I found that undercover operatives were not a significant factor. As 
previously stated, these findings are consistent with previous research in that the prosecution 
strategy is the most significant factor in determining conviction rates. Logically, as Shields 
(2012) suggests, if prosecutors have more evidence, in this case, via confidential informants and 
undercover agents, they may be more likely to pursue more politicized charges. This would 
explain the negative relationship I found between level of assistance provided and conviction 
rates. While the “early and often” arrest and prosecution strategies were brought on by the justice 
system being in a state of tightened coupling from fear from 9/11, it appears that quicker and 
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more frequent arrests and prosecutions did not significantly impact conviction rates, at least not 
in my sample of infiltrated cases. Thus, while the justice system being in a state of tightened 
coupling did not influence conviction rates in infiltrated cases, as prior research suggests, 
tightened coupling was in effect as the overall amount of plea rates and conviction rates 
increased after 9/11. 
Turning to prison sentence lengths, I hypothesized that cases with undercover operatives 
would have longer prison sentences than cases without operatives and that among the three 
Attorney General Guidelines eras the Ashcroft era would have the shortest prison sentences. As 
mentioned in my findings section, I would have preferred to run a multivariate analysis 
controlling for count severity and prior criminal history, but the data are not available for those 
two variables after 9/11, due in large part to changes in the way courts prepare and report 
judgments. With this limitation in mind, the first part of my hypothesis was supported. Cases 
with undercover operatives had a statistically significant greater prison sentence lengths than 
cases without operatives (336 months compared to 73 months, p <.05). This finding supports the 
notion that undercover operations involve more serious situations in which the undercover agent 
or informant is able to gather a greater amount of evidence to use against the defendant, 
ultimately resulting in a longer prison sentence. While this finding was significant, it does come 
with the caveat of needing to be tested with multivariate analysis. The ATS database contains a 
large proportion of cases that do not involve intended or actual targets. Instead, these cases 
involve individuals who have been prosecuted for what are referred to as ‘paper crimes’, or 
crimes involving immigration violations and financial fraud. These paper crime cases contain 
less severe charges that result in shorter prison sentences. Cases such as these indicate the 
necessity to measure overall case severity and to run further statistical analyses.  
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My last finding regarding prison sentences showed that the difference in prison sentence 
lengths between eras was significant with the Ashcroft Era containing the shortest average prison 
sentence length in months. Thus, it appears that structural contextual theory and the net-widening 
theory are helpful in predicting prison sentence lengths. Of course while my models derived 
from these theories are statistically significant, the theories themselves may indirectly influence 
statistical findings through the type of cases that are brought through the justice system. If the 
criminal justice system is in a state of tightened coupling with a wider net casted on crimes being 
investigated, then cases with undercover operatives will only continue to have greater prison 
sentence lengths than cases without operatives. 
My last hypothesis analyzed case outcomes in terms of whether an incident was 
prevented in that case. Specifically, I hypothesized that cases with undercover operatives would 
result in a higher percentage of prevented incidents than cases without undercover operatives. 
The results were statistically significant and supported my hypothesis. There was a greater 
percentage of prevented incidents in cases with undercover operatives (27.6%) than there were in 
cases without operatives (23%). As presented, this finding shows that the time and resources put 
into undercover operations are successful in the FBI’s highest priority of countering terrorism. 
However, this may not be the entire story. When coding prevented incidents, I used a 
conservative measure that only included cases that had no actual targets. The sample of 
prevented incidents was comprised of cases that only had intended targets that were never 
physically attacked, as apposed to cases that contained both intended targets and actual targets. 
By including cases with both intended and actual targets (mixed cases), the difference may be 
greater than my results indicate because mixed cases mask the true number of prevented attacks. 
Nonetheless, cases with undercover operatives result in a higher percentage of prevented 
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incidents than cases without operatives. This finding, along with my previous findings that 
prison sentences in cases with operatives are longer than prison sentences in cases without 
operatives, suggests that undercover operations are not only more successful in preventing 
terrorism incidents, but they are more successful in putting defendants behind bars for a longer 
period of time.  
IX. Conclusion & Future Research 
The purpose of this study was to add to the limited body of empirical research that has 
been conducted on undercover operatives in federal terrorism cases. This study contributed to 
prior literature by focusing on the impact of policy changes on the use of undercover operatives. 
Specifically, the 2002 Ashcroft and 2008 Mukasey Attorney General Guidelines served as a 
defining line between when undercover operatives were used and how policy changes influenced 
undercover operations throughout different temporal periods.  
Future research on undercover agents and confidential informants in federal terrorism 
cases has numerous possible avenues to explore. Expanding this study’s findings, the addition of 
more cases into the ATS database would allow for more advanced statistical analyses into 
examining prison sentence lengths among infiltrated and non-infiltrated cases. Additionally, 
adding cases to the ATS database would allow greater insight into the Mukasey era and its 
influence on undercover operatives as the most recent year with infiltrated cases in the database 
is 2011. Another avenue for future research would be to examine the length of investigations in 
cases with undercover operatives versus cases without undercover operatives. By analyzing how 
long the government takes from the first day of the investigation to the day of arrest, the FBI 
may be able to better allocate time and resources in a more appropriate manner by balancing 
budget and safety issues.  
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